2 FRENCH NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATIONS
2.1 Acts
2.2 Main decrees and ministerial or inter-ministerial orders in force
2.3 ASN decisions
2.4 ASN basic safety rules and guides
3 THE NUCLEAR SAFETY APPROACH IN FRANCE
3.1 The "defence in depth" concept
3.2 Safety management
3.3 Operating experience feedback
4 ASN REGULATION OF CIVIL NUCLEAR FACILITIES
5 ASN'S SANCTIONS POWERS
6 THE FRENCH APPROACH TO THE COMPLEMENTARY SAFETY ASSESSMENTS (CSAS)
6.1 Specifications consistent with the European specifications
6.2 Specifications broader than the European specifications
6.3 Specifications which can also take account of some of the situations resulting from a malevolent act
6.4 Categorization of the facilities concerned
6.5 Assistance of a diversified technical expertise
6.6 An open and transparent approach
7 THE TARGETED INSPECTIONS
7.1 Organisation of the targeted inspections
7.2 Transparency and public information
8 A LONG-TERM APPROACH
B - OVERVIEW OF THE FRENCH NPP
9 OVERVIEW OF THE FRENCH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FLEET
9.1 Description of the nuclear power plants
9.1.1 Main characteristics
9.1.2 Description of the main safety systems
9.2 The main differences between nuclear power plant installations
9.3 The periodic safety reviews
9.4 Use of probabilistic studies in the reactor safety assessment
10 EARTHQUAKES
10.1 Design of the facilities
10.1.1 Seismic level for which the facilities are designed
10.1.2 Characteristics of the Design-Basis Earthquake (DBE)
10.1.3 Conformity of facilities with existing safety requirements
10.2 Evaluation of safety margins
10.2.1 Seismic level leading to significant damage of the fuel assemblies
10.2.2 Seismic level leading to a loss of containment
10.2.3 Seismic level leading to non-design-basis flooding
10.2.4 Measures envisaged to reinforce the robustness of the facilities to the seismic risk
11 FLOODING
11.1 Design of the facilities
11.1.1 Floods for which the facilities are designed
11.1.2 Measures to protect facilities from the flooding risk, including in the design process
11.1.3 Conformity of facilities with the current baseline safety requirements
11.2 Evaluation of safety margins
11.2.1 Estimation of margins in the event of flooding
11.2.2 Measures envisaged to reinforce the robustness of the facilities to the flooding risk
12 OTHER EXTREME NATURAL PHENOMENA RELATED TO FLOODING
12.1 Equipment design for these extreme climatic phenomena
12.2 Evaluation of safety margins
12.2.1 Estimation of margins in extreme meteorological conditions
12.2.2 Measures envisaged to reinforce the robustness of the facilities to extreme meteorological conditions
13 LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLIES AND COOLING SYSTEMS
13.1 Loss of electrical power supplies
13.1.1 Loss of the off-site electrical power supplies
13.1.2 Loss of off-site electrical power supplies and conventional backup supplies
13.1.3 Loss of the off-site electrical power supplies and of the conventional backup supplies and any other on-site backup electrical power source
13.1.4 Conclusion on the planned measures to protect the facilities against the risk of electrical power supply loss
13.1.5 Measures envisaged to enhance facility robustness with respect to electrical power supply losses
13.2 Loss of the cooling systems / heat sink
13.2.1 Loss of the primary heat sink
13.2.2 Loss of the primary heat sink and the alternate heat sink
13.2.3 Conclusion on the planned measures to protect the installations against the risk of losing the ultimate cooling system or the heat sink
8 13.2.4 Measures envisaged to increase the robustness of the facilities with respect to loss of the ultimate cooling system / heat sink
13.3 Loss of the main cooling system combined with loss of the off-site electrical power supplies and the on-site backup supplies
13.3.1 Site autonomy before loss of the normal conditions of core and fuel pool cooling
13.3.2 External actions planned to prevent damage to the fuel
13.3.3 Measures envisaged to reinforce the robustness of the facilities with respect to loss of the main cooling system combined with total loss of the off-site and backup electrical power supplies
14 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT
14.1 Licensee's accident management organisation and measures
14.1.1 Licensee's accident management organisation
14.1.2 Possibility of using existing equipment
14.1.3 Identification of factors that can hinder accident management and the resulting constraints
14.1.4 Conclusion on the organisational provisions for accident management
14.2 Measures envisaged to reinforce accident management capabilities
14.2.1 Before the fuel in the reactor vessel becomes damaged
14.2.2 After the fuel in the reactor vessel has been damaged
14.2.3 After reactor vessel melt-through
14.3 Maintaining containment integrity after damage to the fuel in the reactor core
14.3.1 Elimination of the risk of high-pressure fuel damage or core meltdown
14.3.2 Management of the hydrogen risk in the reactor containment
14.3.3 Prevention of reactor containment overpressure
14.3.4 Prevention of re-criticality
14.3.5 Prevention of basemat melt-through
14.3.6 Supply of electricity and compressed air for operation of the equipment used to preserve the containment integrity
14.3.7 Instrumentation required to protect the integrity of the containmen
14.3.8 Ability to manage several accidents in the event of simultaneous core melt / fuel damage in different units on the same site
14.3.9 Conclusions concerning the planned steps to maintain the integrity of the containment in the event of a severe accident
14.3.10 Steps envisaged for strengthening maintained containment integrity after fuel damage
14.4 Measures to limit radioactive releases in the event of a severe accident
14.4.1 Radioactive releases after loss of containment integrity
14.4.2 Accident management after uncovering of the top of the fuel in the pool
14.4.3 Conclusions concerning the steps taken to limit radioactive releases in the event of a severe accident
15 CONDITIONS CONCERNING THE USE OF OUTSIDE CONTRACTORS (EXCLUDED FROM THE SCOPE OF THE EUROPEAN "STRESS TESTS")
15.1 Scope of activities concerned by subcontracting
15.2 Management of subcontracted activities
15.2.1 Contractor selection procedures
15.2.2 Steps taken to ensure satisfactory working conditions for the contractor companies
15.2.3 Monitoring of subcontracted activities
15.3 Conclusions on the conditions for the use of contractor companies
15.4 Measures envisaged by ASN to strengthen the requirements concerning the conditions for the use of contractor companies
16 CONCLUSION
16.1 Steps to increase the robustness of the facilities (already implemented)
16.2 Identified safety problems
16.3 Strengthening of nuclear safety and forthcoming work
9.1 Description of the nuclear power plants
9.1.1 Main characteristics
9.1.2 Description of the main safety systems
9.2 The main differences between nuclear power plant installations
9.3 The periodic safety reviews
9.4 Use of probabilistic studies in the reactor safety assessment
10 EARTHQUAKES
10.1 Design of the facilities
10.1.1 Seismic level for which the facilities are designed
10.1.2 Characteristics of the Design-Basis Earthquake (DBE)
10.1.3 Conformity of facilities with existing safety requirements
10.2 Evaluation of safety margins
10.2.1 Seismic level leading to significant damage of the fuel assemblies
10.2.2 Seismic level leading to a loss of containment
10.2.3 Seismic level leading to non-design-basis flooding
10.2.4 Measures envisaged to reinforce the robustness of the facilities to the seismic risk
11 FLOODING
11.1 Design of the facilities
11.1.1 Floods for which the facilities are designed
11.1.2 Measures to protect facilities from the flooding risk, including in the design process
11.1.3 Conformity of facilities with the current baseline safety requirements
11.2 Evaluation of safety margins
11.2.1 Estimation of margins in the event of flooding
11.2.2 Measures envisaged to reinforce the robustness of the facilities to the flooding risk
12 OTHER EXTREME NATURAL PHENOMENA RELATED TO FLOODING
12.1 Equipment design for these extreme climatic phenomena
12.2 Evaluation of safety margins
12.2.1 Estimation of margins in extreme meteorological conditions
12.2.2 Measures envisaged to reinforce the robustness of the facilities to extreme meteorological conditions
13 LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLIES AND COOLING SYSTEMS
13.1 Loss of electrical power supplies
13.1.1 Loss of the off-site electrical power supplies
13.1.2 Loss of off-site electrical power supplies and conventional backup supplies
13.1.3 Loss of the off-site electrical power supplies and of the conventional backup supplies and any other on-site backup electrical power source
13.1.4 Conclusion on the planned measures to protect the facilities against the risk of electrical power supply loss
13.1.5 Measures envisaged to enhance facility robustness with respect to electrical power supply losses
13.2 Loss of the cooling systems / heat sink
13.2.1 Loss of the primary heat sink
13.2.2 Loss of the primary heat sink and the alternate heat sink
13.2.3 Conclusion on the planned measures to protect the installations against the risk of losing the ultimate cooling system or the heat sink
8 13.2.4 Measures envisaged to increase the robustness of the facilities with respect to loss of the ultimate cooling system / heat sink
13.3 Loss of the main cooling system combined with loss of the off-site electrical power supplies and the on-site backup supplies
13.3.1 Site autonomy before loss of the normal conditions of core and fuel pool cooling
13.3.2 External actions planned to prevent damage to the fuel
13.3.3 Measures envisaged to reinforce the robustness of the facilities with respect to loss of the main cooling system combined with total loss of the off-site and backup electrical power supplies
14 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT
14.1 Licensee's accident management organisation and measures
14.1.1 Licensee's accident management organisation
14.1.2 Possibility of using existing equipment
14.1.3 Identification of factors that can hinder accident management and the resulting constraints
14.1.4 Conclusion on the organisational provisions for accident management
14.2 Measures envisaged to reinforce accident management capabilities
14.2.1 Before the fuel in the reactor vessel becomes damaged
14.2.2 After the fuel in the reactor vessel has been damaged
14.2.3 After reactor vessel melt-through
14.3 Maintaining containment integrity after damage to the fuel in the reactor core
14.3.1 Elimination of the risk of high-pressure fuel damage or core meltdown
14.3.2 Management of the hydrogen risk in the reactor containment
14.3.3 Prevention of reactor containment overpressure
14.3.4 Prevention of re-criticality
14.3.5 Prevention of basemat melt-through
14.3.6 Supply of electricity and compressed air for operation of the equipment used to preserve the containment integrity
14.3.7 Instrumentation required to protect the integrity of the containmen
14.3.8 Ability to manage several accidents in the event of simultaneous core melt / fuel damage in different units on the same site
14.3.9 Conclusions concerning the planned steps to maintain the integrity of the containment in the event of a severe accident
14.3.10 Steps envisaged for strengthening maintained containment integrity after fuel damage
14.4 Measures to limit radioactive releases in the event of a severe accident
14.4.1 Radioactive releases after loss of containment integrity
14.4.2 Accident management after uncovering of the top of the fuel in the pool
14.4.3 Conclusions concerning the steps taken to limit radioactive releases in the event of a severe accident
15 CONDITIONS CONCERNING THE USE OF OUTSIDE CONTRACTORS (EXCLUDED FROM THE SCOPE OF THE EUROPEAN "STRESS TESTS")
15.1 Scope of activities concerned by subcontracting
15.2 Management of subcontracted activities
15.2.1 Contractor selection procedures
15.2.2 Steps taken to ensure satisfactory working conditions for the contractor companies
15.2.3 Monitoring of subcontracted activities
15.3 Conclusions on the conditions for the use of contractor companies
15.4 Measures envisaged by ASN to strengthen the requirements concerning the conditions for the use of contractor companies
16 CONCLUSION
16.1 Steps to increase the robustness of the facilities (already implemented)
16.2 Identified safety problems
16.3 Strengthening of nuclear safety and forthcoming work