1.2 ASME Task Force on Response to Japan Nuclear Power Events
1.3 The Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Accident
1.4 The Accident‘s Outcome
1.5 Key Issues and Scope of Work
1.6 A New Nuclear Safety Construct
2 AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON NUCLEAR SAFETY
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Life Cycle of Complex Technologies
2.2.1 A Textbook Example: Boiler and Pressure Vessel Technology [9][10]
2.2.2 Other Non-Nuclear Examples
2.3 A Half-Century of Nuclear Experience
2.4 Nuclear Plant Safety
2.5 Acting on Nuclear Lessons Learned
2.6 Summary Comments
2.2 Life Cycle of Complex Technologies
2.2.1 A Textbook Example: Boiler and Pressure Vessel Technology [9][10]
2.2.2 Other Non-Nuclear Examples
2.3 A Half-Century of Nuclear Experience
2.4 Nuclear Plant Safety
2.5 Acting on Nuclear Lessons Learned
2.6 Summary Comments
3 GOING BEYOND THE DESIGN BASIS
3.1 Introduction
3.2 How Designs Have Been Established Up to Now
3.2.1 The Design Basis
3.2.2 Defense-In-Depth
3.2.3 Deterministic Approach to Achieve Defense-In-Depth
3.2.4 Probabilistic Approach to Achieve Defense-In-Depth
3.3 How Designs Might Change to Reflect Lessons Learned from Fukushima Dai-ichi- The Emergent Safety Construct
3.4 Designing New Nuclear Power Plants
3.5 Summary Comments
3.2 How Designs Have Been Established Up to Now
3.2.1 The Design Basis
3.2.2 Defense-In-Depth
3.2.3 Deterministic Approach to Achieve Defense-In-Depth
3.2.4 Probabilistic Approach to Achieve Defense-In-Depth
3.3 How Designs Might Change to Reflect Lessons Learned from Fukushima Dai-ichi- The Emergent Safety Construct
3.4 Designing New Nuclear Power Plants
3.5 Summary Comments
4 ACCIDENT PREVENTION AND CORE COOLING: THE PRINCIPAL SAFETY STRATEGY AND THE OVERRIDING SAFETY FUNCTION
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Growing Recognition of Core Cooling as the Overriding Safety Function
4.3 Insights on Core Cooling from the 1975 Reactor Safety Study
4.4 Insights on Core Cooling from the TMI-2 Accident
4.5 Insights on Core Cooling from the Events of September 11, 2001
4.6 Insights on Core Cooling from the Fukushima Accident
4.7 Protection from Rare Yet Credible Events
4.8 Summary Comments
4.2 Growing Recognition of Core Cooling as the Overriding Safety Function
4.3 Insights on Core Cooling from the 1975 Reactor Safety Study
4.4 Insights on Core Cooling from the TMI-2 Accident
4.5 Insights on Core Cooling from the Events of September 11, 2001
4.6 Insights on Core Cooling from the Fukushima Accident
4.7 Protection from Rare Yet Credible Events
4.8 Summary Comments
5 MANAGING THE UNEXPECTED- HUMAN PERFORMANCE
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Traditional Approaches to Human Performance
5.1.2 Responsibility, Accountability and Authority for Decision-Making in a Crisis
5.1.3 Organizational Human Performance
5.1.4 Organizational Failures
5.2 Human Performance in Nuclear Power Plant Accidents
5.3 Human Performance Lessons from Fukushima
5.4 Summary Comments
5.1.1 Traditional Approaches to Human Performance
5.1.2 Responsibility, Accountability and Authority for Decision-Making in a Crisis
5.1.3 Organizational Human Performance
5.1.4 Organizational Failures
5.2 Human Performance in Nuclear Power Plant Accidents
5.3 Human Performance Lessons from Fukushima
5.4 Summary Comments
6 MANAGING ALL RISKS
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Defining Accident Management
6.3 History of Accident Management
6.4 Accident Management at Fukushima
6.4.1 Multi-Faceted Disaster
6.4.2 Accident Measures Against a Severe Tsunami
6.4.3 Plant Conditions
6.5 Lessons in Accident Management from Fukushima
6.6 Post-Fukushima Global Response
6.7 Beyond the Present Response
6.8 Summary Comments
6.2 Defining Accident Management
6.3 History of Accident Management
6.4 Accident Management at Fukushima
6.4.1 Multi-Faceted Disaster
6.4.2 Accident Measures Against a Severe Tsunami
6.4.3 Plant Conditions
6.5 Lessons in Accident Management from Fukushima
6.6 Post-Fukushima Global Response
6.7 Beyond the Present Response
6.8 Summary Comments
7 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
7.1 Introduction
7.2 EP-Related Lessons from Fukushima Dai-ichi
7.3 EP-Related Lessons in the New Safety Construct
7.3.1 Infrastructure Improvements
7.3.2 More Realistic Drills and Training
7.3.3 Criterion for Long-Term Habitability (Reentry)
7.3.4 Building Public Trust
7.3.5 Updated Basis for EPZ Size
7.4 Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Approach to EP
7.5 Summary Comments
7.2 EP-Related Lessons from Fukushima Dai-ichi
7.3 EP-Related Lessons in the New Safety Construct
7.3.1 Infrastructure Improvements
7.3.2 More Realistic Drills and Training
7.3.3 Criterion for Long-Term Habitability (Reentry)
7.3.4 Building Public Trust
7.3.5 Updated Basis for EPZ Size
7.4 Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Approach to EP
7.5 Summary Comments
8 REINFORCING THE NUCLEAR SAFETY CONSTRUCT
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Community Outreach Conducted During the Normal Course of Events
8.3 Crisis Communications: What is Happening and Why
8.3.1 EP Command and Control, and Decision-Making Authority
8.4 Earning Public Trust
8.5 Summary Comments
8.2 Community Outreach Conducted During the Normal Course of Events
8.3 Crisis Communications: What is Happening and Why
8.3.1 EP Command and Control, and Decision-Making Authority
8.4 Earning Public Trust
8.5 Summary Comments
9 FORGING A NEW NUCLEAR SAFETY CONSTRUCT
9.1 Introduction
9.2 The Evolving Nuclear Safety Construct
9.3 The Lesson Learned
9.4 A New Nuclear Safety Construct
9.5 Principles of the New Nuclear Safety Construct
9.6 Additional Conclusions on the New Safety Construct
9.6.1 Design Basis Extension
9.6.2 Risk-Informed Defense-In-Depth Construct
9.6.3 Human Performance Management
9.6.4 Accident Management
9.6.5 Emergency Preparedness Management
9.6.6 Communications and Public Trust Issues
9.7 Recommendations for Next Steps in Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct
9.7.1 Workshop(s) on Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct
9.7.2 Updating and Expanding Nuclear Codes and Standards
9.7.3 Dissemination of Conclusions and Guidance
9.8 Summary Conclusions
9.2 The Evolving Nuclear Safety Construct
9.3 The Lesson Learned
9.4 A New Nuclear Safety Construct
9.5 Principles of the New Nuclear Safety Construct
9.6 Additional Conclusions on the New Safety Construct
9.6.1 Design Basis Extension
9.6.2 Risk-Informed Defense-In-Depth Construct
9.6.3 Human Performance Management
9.6.4 Accident Management
9.6.5 Emergency Preparedness Management
9.6.6 Communications and Public Trust Issues
9.7 Recommendations for Next Steps in Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct
9.7.1 Workshop(s) on Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct
9.7.2 Updating and Expanding Nuclear Codes and Standards
9.7.3 Dissemination of Conclusions and Guidance
9.8 Summary Conclusions
References
Appendix A - The Social Impact of Nuclear Power
A.1 Introduction
A.2 Economic and Socio-Political Impact of Major Reactor Accidents
A.2.1 Impact of the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident
A.2.2 Impact of the Chernobyl Accident
A.2.3 Impact of the Three Mile Island 2 Accident
A.3 The Present and Future Value of Nuclear Power in the U.S
A.4 The Reliability of Nuclear Power
A.5 Price Stability and Energy Security
A.6 Greenhouse Gas Emissions
A.7 Relative Health Risks of Electrical Generation Sources
A.2 Economic and Socio-Political Impact of Major Reactor Accidents
A.2.1 Impact of the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident
A.2.2 Impact of the Chernobyl Accident
A.2.3 Impact of the Three Mile Island 2 Accident
A.3 The Present and Future Value of Nuclear Power in the U.S
A.4 The Reliability of Nuclear Power
A.5 Price Stability and Energy Security
A.6 Greenhouse Gas Emissions
A.7 Relative Health Risks of Electrical Generation Sources
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations and Acronyms
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1- Pivotal Events in World Nuclear Experience
Table 2- Comparison of Deterministic and PRA Approaches to Safety Assessment
Table 3- Improvements Suggested by Events at Fukushima- The Emergent Safety Construct
Table 4- List of Important Fukushima EP-Related Lessons
Table 5- Dose Exceedance Results for Plant with Recent Source Terms vs. NUREG-0396
Table A-1- Average Capacity Factor in the U.S. by Energy Source (1998- 2009)
Table 2- Comparison of Deterministic and PRA Approaches to Safety Assessment
Table 3- Improvements Suggested by Events at Fukushima- The Emergent Safety Construct
Table 4- List of Important Fukushima EP-Related Lessons
Table 5- Dose Exceedance Results for Plant with Recent Source Terms vs. NUREG-0396
Table A-1- Average Capacity Factor in the U.S. by Energy Source (1998- 2009)
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1- Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct
Figure 2- Boiler Explosion Trends in the U.S.
Figure 3- Commercial Aircraft Accident Rates by Year
Figure 4- Safety Significant Events Per Plant and Fleet Capacity Factors
Figure 5- Organizational Levels/Barriers of Defense-In-Depth
Figure 6- Physical Barriers of Defense-In-Depth
Figure 7- Phases of Accident Management
Figure 8- Public Opinion on Nuclear Power Before and After the Fukushima Accident
Figure A-1- Nuclear Generation from Existing U.S. Nuclear Plants
Figure A-2- U.S. Electricity Production Costs by Fuel Type
Figure A-3- Power Generation by Fuel Type (1990 to 2040)Figure A-3- Power Generation by Fuel Type (1990 to 2040)
Figure 2- Boiler Explosion Trends in the U.S.
Figure 3- Commercial Aircraft Accident Rates by Year
Figure 4- Safety Significant Events Per Plant and Fleet Capacity Factors
Figure 5- Organizational Levels/Barriers of Defense-In-Depth
Figure 6- Physical Barriers of Defense-In-Depth
Figure 7- Phases of Accident Management
Figure 8- Public Opinion on Nuclear Power Before and After the Fukushima Accident
Figure A-1- Nuclear Generation from Existing U.S. Nuclear Plants
Figure A-2- U.S. Electricity Production Costs by Fuel Type
Figure A-3- Power Generation by Fuel Type (1990 to 2040)Figure A-3- Power Generation by Fuel Type (1990 to 2040)